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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES S. DEVINE, MRS·. J'AMES 
S. DEVINE and JANET GUSINDA, 
Plaintiffs and AppeUants, 
-vs.-
HELEN COOK and W. S. HATCH 
CO., INC., 
Defen~datnts and Respondents. 
Case No. 8145 
BRIEF· OF· APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action arising out of an automobile colli-
sion in which the automobile owned and driven by the 
plaintiff, James S. Devine, collided with an automobile 
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driven by the defendant, Helen Cook. The collision occur-
red at the intersection of 1500 South Street, Bountiful, 
Utah and U. S. Highway 91, (Tr. 5, 6). The plaintiffs 
were all in the car proceeding north going to Ogden on 
U. S. 91; the defendant Helen Cook had been pToceeding 
east on 1500 South Street and had come to a stop at the 
stop sign where said street intersected with the through 
highway. A tank truck and four-wheel trailer and a trac-
tor pulling a semi-trailer transporting a tank owned by 
the defendant W. S. Hatch Company had also been pro-
ceeding north on U. S. Highway 91, but had slowed down 
and one of the trucks had come to a stop in preparation of 
turning left to go west on 1500 South St., (Tr. 7, 15, 16). 
Although the driver of the first truck stated that he did 
not remember motioning or signalling to Mrs. Cook to 
proceed across the intersection, (Tr. 174) Mrs. Cook and 
a witness, Elora Hutchings, both testified that the driver 
had motioned or signalled to Mrs. Cook to clear the inter-
section, (Tr. 50, 60). The truck drivers stated that they 
could not make a left turn until Mrs. Cook had cleared 
the intersection, (Tr. 174, 175). The defendant Cook 
stated that upon being signalled by the truck drivers to 
clear the intersection she proceeded across U. S. High-
way 91 until she passed in front of the truck, at which 
time she first noticed the automobile of the plaintiff. 
Then it was too late to avoid the collision, (Tr. 61). The 
plaintiff, James S. Devine, testified that the two tankers 
had previously passed his automobile; however, as they 
approached the intersection they began to slow down and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
he assumed that they were either going to stop or make 
a left turn, and he likewise began to slow down. As he 
overtook the last tanker he glanced between the· two 
trucks and saw a flash or a blur and he immediately put 
on his brakes, pulled over to the right shoulder of the 
road but he was unable sufficiently to stop his car to pre-
vent the collision, (Tr. 16). The left front of the D·evine 
car collided with the right front of the Cook car. 
At the time of the collision Mrs. Devine stated that 
she was riding in the front seat, sitting sideways with 
her back toward the right hand front door talking to her 
sister who was riding in the back seat, (Tr. 68). As a 
result of the collision Mrs. Devine received a fractured 
rib, ( Tr. 70), a fractured metatarsal bone in the foot and 
a tooth was knocked loose, which resulted in the nerve 
becoming dead and required extraction thereof and a 
replacement with an artificial tooth by means of bridge 
work, (Tr. 69). The plaintiff, l\!iss Gusinda received 
various bruises and bumps and co1nplained of pain in her 
back and it was later determined or diagnosed that she 
'\Vas suffering from a ruptured inter-vertebral disc, ( Tr. 
122, 150). In addition to general pain and soreness in the 
area of her back upon three separate occasions prior to 
the time of trial, the disc had protruded into the spinal 
column, causing severe pains and temporary or partial 
paralysis, or inability to use her legs, (Tr. 89, 91, 150). 
The plaintiff, Dr. Devine, is seeking to recover damages 
to his auto1nobile and personal injuries suffered as a re-
sult of a 1noderate brain concussion, (Tr. 22), caused 
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from a blow upon his head, and all of the plaintiffs are 
seeking special damages in addition to their general 
damages. 
The defendants 1n their answer denied negligence 
and also pleaded contributory negligence of Dr. James S. 
Devine as being the sole and proximate cause of the colli-
sion and resulting injuries. The case was tried before a 
jury which returned a verdict of no cause of action as to 
all three plaintiffs. Although the defendants did not 
specifically plead any contributory negligence on the part 
of. Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda, passengers in the 
automobile driven by Dr. Devine, the court permitted the 
defendants p-rior to instructing the jury to amend their 
pleadings to allege contributory negligence on the part 
of such passengers, ( Tr. 188), and the court then pro-
ceeded to instruct and submit to the jury the issue· of 
contributory negligence as to all of the plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS PREJUDICIALLY ACCENTU-
ATED THE DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND MINIMIZED 
THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT II. 
IT WAS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON AN 
ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS, MISS GUSINDA AND MRS. DEVINE. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT'S INSTRU·CTIONS REGARDING CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJU-
DICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS PREJUDICIALLY ACCENTU-
ATED THE DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND MINIMIZED 
THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
Instruction No. 1 contained the statement of .the 
court as to the allegations of the plaintiffs concerning 
negligence of the defendants and the answer of the de-
fendants alleging contributory negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff, James s .. Devine. 
Instruction No. 2 concerned the burden of proof and 
the necessary allegations which must be proved by the 
plaintiffs and specifically mentioned that the court would 
further instruct the jury "relative to contributory negli-
gence as it applies respectively to the plaintiffs." 
Instruction No. 3 defined the terms: negligence, 
contributory negligence and proximate cause. 
In Instruction No. 4 the court specifically instructed 
the jury as to the issue of contributory negligence and in 
so doing in part stated as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you find by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that Dr. James S. 
Devine was guilty of contributory negligence, 
which in any degree contributed to the happening 
of this accident, he cannot recover even though 
you find that one or both of said defendants was 
negligent in the happening of this collision. It is 
the law of this state that a plaintiff who is negli-
gent and such negligence proximately contributes 
to the hap·pening of the accident in question that 
he cannot recover. Therefore, you are instructed 
that if you find Dr. Devine was negligent, as I 
have above indicated, and the same proximately 
contributed to the happening of the collision he 
cannot recover." 
The court, in the same instruction, advised the jury 
that if Dr. Devine's negligence was the sole proximate 
cause of the collision then the other two plaintiffs could 
not recover against the defendants. The court continued 
as follows.: 
"In this connection you are further instructed 
that if you find either one of the woman plaintiffs 
quilty of contributory negligence which in any de-
gree proximately contributed to the happening of 
the collision then and in that event such plain tiff 
so guilty cannot recover." 
So far as the above instructions go they would not 
be objectionable except as argued in Point III. !-low-
ever, in reviewing the balance of the instructions which 
in two other separate and specific instructions again 
instructs on the issue of contributory negligence there 
app~ears to be prejudicial error. 
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Instruction No. 5 contains a general instruction as to 
the operation of vehicles upon the highway with reference 
to speed, starting, stopping, slowing down, turning, keep-
ing a proper lookout, etc. Such instruction as applied 
to all of the parties was no doubt proper. However, In-
struction No. 6 again reverts to the issue of contributory 
negligence on the part of the two plaintiffs who were 
passengers in the automobile. The instruction provided 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that it is the duty of 
guests in an automobile to use all reasonable pre-
cautions for their own safety, and in the dis-
charge of such duty, they are required to see and 
t:o w~arn the driver of the automobile in which they 
are guests of the dangers which a reasonable and 
prudent person riding as a guest in the automobile 
of another would use for his own safety; and if 
they fail to use such reasonable care they are 
negligent, and if such negligence possibly contri-
butes to any extent, howeveT slight, to produce 
their injury they cannot recover. Thus in this 
case, if you find that at the time of the collision 
and resulting injuries, if any, the plaintiffs, Janet 
Gusinda and l\1:rs. James S. Devine, or either of 
the1n, were guests in the automobile driven by 
James S. Devine, and that a reasonable and pru-
dent person under all of the facts and circunl-
stances as shown by the evidence should have seen 
the danger of the collision which caused their in-
juries, if any, and would have warned James S. 
Devine of such danger, and that by such seeing and 
warning, the collision and injuries, if any, 1nay 
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have been averted, and that they, or either of 
them, fa.iled to see the danger or failed to wa.rn 
James S. Devine of it, and that such negligence 
. contributed to produce the collision and resulting 
injuries, if any, then the person who was guilty 
of such negligence cannot recover for her injuries, 
and your verdict in the action brought by her must 
be in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiffs." (Emphasis added.) 
It will be noted by the foregoing instruction that 
the court commences the instruction by stating that it is a 
positive duty of the guests to see and to warn the driver 
if, under the circumstances a reasonable and prudent 
person would do so, and then particularly identifies 
these plaintiffs and again repeats that if they failed to 
see or warn the driver such conduct would constitute 
negligence and would bar their recovery. Contrast this 
instruction with Instructions No. 7 and No. 9 pertaining 
to the duty of the two defendants and again the Instruc-
tion No. 8 a.s to the duty of the driver Dr. D·evine. In-
struction No. 7 was as follows : 
"You are instructed that a driver of a vehicle 
upon a highway has no duty to ascertain or advise 
other drivers whether they may safely enter upon 
or pass over said highway; but if the driver un-
dertakes to make such a determination and does 
so advise others, then he· must exercise reason-
able caution, circun1spection and care that his 
conclusions are correct." * * * 
The Court then proceeded to discuss whether W. S. 
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Hatch Company, through its drivers, did undertake to 
determine whether the defendant, Helen Cook, could safe-
ly enter and pass through the intersection. The instruc-
tion proceeds first with the negative that there is no 
duty except under certain circumstances. 
Instruction No. 8, pertaining to the duty of James S. 
Devine, provided in part as follows : 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of 
James S. Devine in driving down the highway to-
ward the intersection in which this collision oc-
curred to keep a reasonable and adequate look-
out, * * * to use reasonable care * * * to a void the 
hazzards. * * * It was the plain tiff James S. De-
vine's duty to observe the relative position of 
other vehicles on the highway, the existence of the 
intersection, and to proceed -in such a manne-r that 
he would keep his vehicle under reasonable con-
trol and prevent the same from colliding with 
other objects or vehicles lawfully upon the high-
way. If you find that the plaintiff J'ames S. De-
vine at said time and place failed to exercise rea-
sonable control of the vehicle he was driving, then 
he would be negligent." (Emphasis added.) 
This specific narrative type instruction discussing the 
conduct of the plaintiff, James S. Devine, was unneces-
sary in view of Instruction No. 5 covering the duties of 
drivers generally, and Instruction No. 4 on Contributory 
Negligence. Again note the positive nature of the instruc-
tion as to 'vhat was required of the plaintiff. 
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The eontrast between Instruetion No. 8 and Instruc-
tion No. 9, which follows, is again significant: 
"You are instructed that the law does not re-
quire a person to be extraordinarily alert, or to 
foresee all that can be seen by looking back after 
the happening of an accident. Where a person 
exercised reasonable and ordinary caution; that is, 
a degree of care, which would ordinarily be exer-
cised by a reasonable and prudent person, he is 
not negligent. In this case, the defendant, Helen 
Cook, was not under a duty to foresee all that she 
might at this time be able to foresee or appreci-
ate by looking back at the accident, nor w:as she 
required to use extraord'im.ary caut:ion for the 
avoidance of any injury that she could reasonably 
have expected under the circumstances. If you 
find from the evidence in this case that this de-
fendant did observe that degree of care and cau-
tion that should be ordinarily observed by ordi-
narily prudent persons under similar circum-
stances, then you are instructed that the defend-
ant, Helen Cook, discharged the duties imposed 
upon her and you should return a verdict in her 
favor." (Emphasis added.) 
It will again be noted that the instruction is by its terms 
negative. 
Instructions No. 4, 6 and 8 pertaining to the stand-
ard of care and contributory negligence are positive 
and peremptory, while Instructions 7 and 9 pertaining 
to the standard of care required of defendants are nega-
tive and nugatory. 
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Instruction No. 10 is a general instruction that there 
are sometimes collisions which are unavoidable accidents 
and if the jury found that this collision was caused not 
by any negligent conduct of any of the parties they could 
find that it was an accident. The balance of the instruc-
tions are stock instructions or deal with the issue of dam-
ages. 
The instructions cast doubt upon the case of the 
plaintiffs by frequent use of the words "if any" in refer-
ence to the collision and injuries. As an example part of 
instruction stated as follows: 
"Thus in this case, if you find that at the time 
of the collision and resulting injuries, if amy, the 
plaintiffs Janet Gusinda and Mrs. James S. De-
vine, or either of them, * * * should have seen 
the danger of the collision which caused their in-
juries, if any, * * * and that by such seeing and 
warning, the collision and injuries, if any, * * * 
and that such negligence contributed to p~roduce 
the collision and resulting injuries, if any, * * *" 
(Emphasis added.) 
No such qualifying terms were used when referring 
to negligent conduct of these plaintiffs. Rather the con-
cluding part of the instruction states: 
"And that they, or either of them failed to see 
the danger or failed to warn James S .. Devine of 
it, and that such negligence contributed to produce 
the collision and resulting injuries, if any, then 
the person who was guilty of such negligence, 
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cannot recover for her injuries and your verdict 
in the action brought by her must be in favor of 
the defendants and against the plaintiffs." (Em-
phasi~ added.) 
By such qualifying terms the court cast doubt as to 
the existence of any injuries suffered by the plaintiffs 
and characterizes the conduct of the plaintiffs as being 
negligent. This accentuation of the defendant's case, 
as included in the instruction requested by the defendants, 
was .one more. factor tending to discredit the claim of 
the plaintiffs and obviously caused the jury to believe 
that the court thought the plaintiffs were negligent and 
their alleged injuries were fallacious. 
In addition to emphasizing the p·ositive requirements 
and duties of the plaintiffs and stating in the negative 
manner the duties of the defendants the court continually 
and rep·etitiously instructed the jury concerning the con-
tributory negligence of the defendant. The court not 
only mentioned the issue of contributory negligence in 
the first instruction pertaining to the allegations of the 
plaintiffs, in the second instruction dealing with the bur-
den of proof, and in the third instruction in defining 
the terms., but specifically instructed the jury as to the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs in three of the 
other instructions pertaining to liability. Instructon No. 
4 discusses contributory negligence of all of the plaintiffs, 
Instruction No. 5 deals with the general duty of all 
drivers, Instruction No. 6 the contributory negligence of 
the plaintiffs, Miss Gusinda and Mrs. Devine, and In-
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struction No. 7 the duty of the truck drivers. And then 
again in Instruction No. 8 the court returned to the issue 
of contributory negligence of the driver James S. Devine. 
In Instruction No. 9 the court minimized the duty of the 
defendant, Helen Cook, and in Instruction No. 10 dis-
cusses unavoidable accidents. Punctuated throughout the 
entire group of instructions as to liability is the continual 
and repetitious discussion of contributory negligence. 
The court in the case of Keeshin Motor Express Co., 
Inc. et al v. Glassman, 219 Ind. 538, N.E. 2d 842, 850 
had occasion to consider repetition of instructions as a 
ground of reversible error. The court reviews in some 
detail cases on this subject matter and cites at page 853 
of the North Eastern 2d Reporter numerous cases which 
granted a reversal on the sole ground of repetition of in-
structions. Other cases are cited where repetition of in-
structions was one of the grounds for reversal. The 
court held as follows: 
"With this situation it was incumbent upon 
the trial court in his instructions to clarify the is-
sues without giving any of them undue promi-
nence. This was not done. The instructions as a 
whole are lengthy, intricate, repetitious, argu-
n1entative and confusing. The tend, to appellant's 
disadvantage, by needless repetition to draw the 
jury's consideration away from the conduct of ap-
pellee's brother and to lead the jury to believe 
th~t, in the court's opinion, what he did or failed 
to do was of little consequence." 
rrhe TJ tah court in the case of Shields v. Utah Light 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
& Traction Co. 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349 stated that 
"the reiteration of given p·ropositions to the jury in the 
instructions does not have judicial approval." After re-
viewing in some· detail the instructions the court held: 
"And the resulting emphasis on applicable 
laws unfavorable to plaintiff's side as the result 
of continual reference and repeating of certain 
law p·ropositions resulted in the unbalancing of the 
charge, and error." 
·Certainly continual repetition of instructions on con-
tributory negligence and the positive delineation of the 
duties of the plaintffs, as contrasted with the qualified 
negative statement of the duties of the dtfendants, only 
p·ermitted the jury to return its verdict of no cause of 
action. T·he instructions taken as a whole, even assuming 
they were correct as given, constitutes prejudicial error. 
POINT. II. 
IT .WAS ERROR T·O INSTRUCT THE JURY ON AN 
ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS, MISS GUSINDA AND MRS. DEVINE. 
As previously stated the defendants did not plead 
contributory negligence on the part of the two passengers 
in Dr. Devine's automobile. Only after the case had been 
tried and the court had indicated the instructions 'vhich 
were to be given, and upon objection· by counsel for the 
plaintiff that the issue of contributory negligence was not 
supported by the pleadings or the evidence, were the 
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pleadings amended to raise the issue of contributory 
negligence as to each of these two plaintiffs. It is sub-
nlitted that the evidence did not support any instruction 
on this issue. No witnesses other than the plain tiffs 
themselves gave any testimony concerning their conduct 
or what happened so far as these plaintiffs were con-
cerned. The complete testimony of these two witnesses, 
as to what they observed and what they did prior to the 
collision indicates that there was no basis for the charge 
that they did not act as reasonable and prudent persons. 
Mrs. Devine testified as follows : 
"A. I was talking to my sister who was In the 
back seat. I was sitting sideways and I no-
ticed the two big oil tankers passing us up 
and then they began to slow down and I no-
ticed that our car was slowing down ; and then. 
I was looking at the oil tankers and I noticed 
this blur, and then I felt our car brakes being 
put on and the next thing I heard was coming 
to and trying to get air, trying· to· breathe, but 
my lungs and chest wouldn't expand enough 
and I thought I was dying.'' (Tr. 68). 
Upon cross examination the witness, Mrs. Devine, 
testified as follows: 
"Q. You were looking out the window, out the 
front window all the tirne ~ 
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A. No, I · was sitting sideways in the car, talk-
ing to my sister and looking out at the tank-
ers. 
Q. And you were looking out the- side at the tank-
ers, is that correct~ As you were going from 
Salt Lake to the point where the accident oc-
curred, were you observing the highway~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see Mrs. Cook's car prior to the colli-
sion~· 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you assume that to be the car that you 
later collided with~ 
A. After I came to, yes. 
Q. Now did you say anything to your husband 
about that car~ 
A. Well, I imagine so. I don't get excited that 
way. 
Q. Pardon~ 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I idon't become excited that way. 
·· In othe-r words, you didn't become excited 
so you didn't say anything to your :husband 
about the car then~ 
No. 
Q. You didn't tell him about this blur you saw 
crossing the highway~ 
A. No, because he had p·ut on the brakes at the 
same time that I saw it." (Tr. 79). 
The testimony of the plaintiff, Miss Gusinda, was as 
follows: 
"A. Well, we were coming down this road, we were 
on our way to Ogden and we were driving 
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abreast of. these two tanker trucks. I think 
we were behind the second one and at first 
they were passing us and then we started to 
gradually catch up to them and I remember 
that at the time I thought I saw a wheel or 
s __ omething on the other side of the road. I am 
rather mixed up on that part of it. Anyway, 
I thought the first truck went on and that 
this car came off of the side road and that was 
the one that hit us, that went in front of the 
trucks ; the second truck cleared it." 
Q. Alright. Where were you just prior to the col-
lision~ 
A. I was sitting in the back seat of the car, just 
about in the middle." (Tr. 86). 
And on cross examination the witness further testi-
fied: 
"Q. Now returning for the 1noment to the accident, 
I believe you stated that you saw a wheel or 
something, some part of a car coming across 
the highway~ 
A. Yes, sir, I thought I did. But I don't know if 
it is hearsay or if it is what I heard after the 
accident. 
Q. But your impression is that you saw a car 
coming across the highway~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't say anything to the driver of the 
car in which you were riding, DT. Devine, 
about it, did you~ 
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A. But at the time the brakes were being ap-
plied." ( Tr. 97). 
The foregoing testimony, being all of the evidence 
of any negligence of these two plaintiffs, does not sho": 
any lack of due care, or failure ,to act ws a reasonable 
prudent person would have acted under the circum-
stances. If there is no evidence of contributory negli-
gence, the law is clear that· the jury should not be in-
structed on such an issue. 
In Christensen v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Com-
p,any, 35 Utah 137, 146, 99 P. 676, the court quoted with 
approval the following: 
"Where the evidence of negligence is entirely 
inferential and the testimony for the defendant 
is clear and undisputed to the effect that there 
was no negligence, the plaintiff's case is overcome 
as a matter of law, and it becon1es the duty of the 
Judge to take the case from the jury." 
In this case there is no evidence on the part of the 
two passengers but rather their undisputed testimony 
shows no negligence and therefore the court should not 
have instructed the jury as to any contributory negligence 
on their part. 
In White v. City of Trilnidad, 52 Pac. 214, 10 Colo. 
App. 327, the court discussed the issue of submitting 
an instruction on contributory negligence even though 
there was no pleading or sufficient evidence to support 
the instruction. The court stated as follows : 
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"The evidence concerning her lameness was 
the only evidence by which contributory negli-
gence was sought to be proved; and, while the 
evidence was inadmissable under the pleadings, 
it, for the purpose for which it was elicited, was 
a failure. It proved nothing against the plaintiff. 
But the jury may have regarded it as important, 
and as having a bearing on her right to a recovery, 
when they listened to the instruction of the court 
on the subject of contributory negligence. Instruc-
tions must be based on evidence. A correct de-
claration of the law is erroneous when there is no 
evidence to which it can be applied. It can have no 
effect except to mislead the jury, and, where an 
instruction of that nature has been given, we are 
bound to pTesume that the jury were misled by it. 
('Citation of Authority) The judgment must be 
reversed." 
In Smith v. Oregon and N.W.R. Co., 33 Utah 129, 142, 
93 P. 185, the court held that where there was a plea of 
contributory negligence but there was no evidence on 
which to predicate a charge on contributory negligence 
such an instruction should not have been given and also 
giving an instruction concerning an intervening cause 
without evidence to support the same constituted pre-
judicial error. 
In Belnap v. Widdison, 32 Utah 246, 90 P. 393, 395 
the court stated: 
"The rule is well settled that instructions 
should be predicated upon the pleadings and evi-
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dence in the case, and that an instruction, even 
though it may contain a correct statement of the 
law in the abstract, if it has no application to the 
issues and evidence in the case, should be refused. 
The reason for the rule is that instructions not 
pertinent to the case have a tendency to mislead 
the jury and to draw their minds from the issues 
in the case. The instruction, while it correctly 
states the law as an abstract proposition, has no 
application whatever to the facts in this case and 
was therefore erroneous, and the giving of it could 
not have been other than p·rejudicial to the inter-
ests of the plaintiff." 
The court held in the recent case of Clay v. Dunford, 
239 P. 2d 1075, that it was prejudicial error to instruct 
on the issue of assumption of risk when the facts in the 
case did not present such an issue. Likewise, it was pre-
judicial error in this case to instruct on the issue of con-
tributory negligence as to the two passengers of the 
automobile, even assuming the- instruction was valid as 
given. It is submitted however that the instructions were 
invalid as discussed hereinafter and also under point 
III. 
By their testimony it i~ admit_ted t4at these plaintiffs 
did not distinctly see the car driven by the defendant, 
Mrs. Cook, and that they had no opportunity and did not 
warn the driver of their vehicle. Yet in spite of this the 
court instructs the jury as to contributory negligence of 
these plaintiffs without any further evidence of negli-
gence or violation ·of a duty of reasonable care. The in-
struction is such that it amounts to a direction to the 
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jury to find these two defendants contributorily negli-
gent. Instruction No. 6 stated: 
"You are instructed that it is the duty of 
guests in an automobile to use all reasonable 
precautions for their own safety, and in the dis-
charge of such duty, they are required to see and 
to warn the d,river of the automobile, in which they 
are guests, of dangers which a reasonable and 
prudent person, riding as a guest in the auto-
mobile of another would use for his own S"afety, 
and if they fail to use such reasonable care, they 
are negligent, and if such negligence proximately 
contributes to any extent, however slight, to pro-
duce their injury, they cannot recover. Thus, in 
this case, if you find that at the time of the colli-
sion and resulting injuries, if any, the plaintiffs, 
Janet Gusinda and Mrs. James S. Devine, or 
either of them, were guests in the automobile 
driven by J'ames D. Devine, and that a reasonable 
and prudent person under all the facts and cir-
cumstances as shown by the evidence would have 
seen the danger of the collision which caused their 
injuries, if any, and would have warned James S. 
Devine of such danger, and that by such seeing 
and warning, the collision and injuries, if aJYli!J, 
may have been averted, and that they, or either of 
them, failed to see the danger or failed t.o wa,rn 
Ja1nes S. Devine of it, and that such negligence 
contributed to produce the collision and resulting 
injuries, if any, then the person guilty of such 
negligence cannot recover for her injuries, and the 
verdict in the actions brought by her must be in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff." 
J\.lthough the instruction refers to conduct of a reason-
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able person under the circumstances there can be no ques-
tion but what the instruction as worded and given left 
the imp-ression with the jury that the guests had a duty to 
see and to warn the driver.· Yet the witnesses testified 
that they had not seen the automobile clearly enough to 
know that it was an automobile and that they had not 
had an opportunity to warn the driver. Under such cir-
cumstances the instruction p-ractically amounted to a 
direction to find the plaintiffs guilty of contributory 
negligence. The law does not require that guests of auto-
mobiles observe, see and warn everything that might he 
a danger in the path of the vehicle . 
. In Cento et al. v. S.ecurity Building Co., 99 s .. W. 2d 
1, (Mo. 1936) the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
sustained as a result of boards loaded in an elevator 
protruding through the top of the elevator and coming in 
contact with a beam across the top of the elevator shaft 
which caused the boards to buckle, break and strike the 
plaintiff. The jury found the case in favor of the defend-
ant and a motion for a new trial was granted in favor of 
the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. One of the 
reasons for granting the new trial was an instruction 
on contributory negligence to the effect that the plain-
tiff should have observed the condition of the elevator 
shaft. The court's discussion concerning this point was 
as follows: 
"We now take up· the defendant's instructions 
3 and 6 which plaintiff says were erroneous and 
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justified the court in granting the new trial. In-
struction 3 told the jury that it was plaintiff's duty 
to exercise ordinary care to observe the condition 
of the elevator and shaft and that if it were found 
that, by the exercise of ordinary care, plaintiff 
would have observed the conditions existing inside 
the elevator shaft and that plain tiff did not ob-
serve the conditions inside the shaft, 'then his 
failure to do so was negligence.' This instruction, 
in effect, was peremptory, because plaintiff ad-
mitted that he did not give any attention to the 
shaft, insofar as looking up the shaft was. con-
cerned. If he had looked, he would have seen that 
there was a beam over the shaft only a few feet 
at most above the tops of the boards." 
The court then discusses evidence which may have 
justified a proper instruction on contributory negligence 
and stated as follows: 
"'These questions are legitimate subjects for 
argument on the usual instruction on contributory 
negligence, but to peremptorily direct, in effect, 
that if plaintiff, under the facts here, did not dis-
cover the beam, he was guilty of negligence, we 
think was error." 
Note the similarity of the instruction in the Missouri 
case with Instruction No. 6 in the present case. The 
~lissouri court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff in 
the exercise of ordinary care would have observed the 
beam across the elevator 8haft and did not observe such 
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condition "then his failure to do so was negligence." 
In Instruction No. 6 the Utah court instructed the jury 
that "they are required to see and to warn the driver of 
the automobile" of such danger which a reasonable and 
prudent p'erson would have done and if "they or either 
of them failed to see the danger or failed to warn James 
S. Devine of it" and such negligence contributed to pro-
duce the collision and resulting injuries, the plaintiffs 
would be guilty of negligence and the jury must return a 
verdict in favor of the defendants. and against the plain-
tiffs. The effect of such an instruction could only be to 
place undue importance and a higher degree of duty upon 
the plaintiffs. which, coupled with the repetition of in-
structions on contributory negligence, must have influ-
enced the jury to determine that there was in fact contri-
butory negligence and therefore they felt compelled tore-
turn their verdicts of no cause of action. 
The Missouri case in its decision reyjewed a similar 
case of Crawford v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 215 
Mo. 394, 114 S.W. 1057, 1062, where the plaintiff was 
charged with contributory negligence in failing to ob-
S'erve gates on a stock pen near the railroad tracks. The 
testimony was that the plaintiff was watching the cattle 
in the railroad car and did not look and see or observe 
the gates. The Missouri court quoted the following from 
the Crawford case: 
"The evidence shows that when he was com-
ing down the stairway he would have seen them 
if he had looked, and it also ·shows th.at he did 
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not look, but that, on the contrary, he came 
down the stairway with his mind on the cattle, 
leaning over the railing with his face turned 
south. If the plaintiff sa\v the gates open, he 
was guilty of negligence in not taking care to 
avoid coming into collision with them; but the 
testimony is that he did not see them. Was he 
negligent because he did not look in that direc-
tion as he came down the stairwayf As a general 
rule a man is not required to look for . danger 
when he has no cause to anticipate danger, or 
when danger does not exist except as caused 
by the negligence of another." 
In this case the passengers were under no duty to 
anticipate danger caused by the negligence of others, 
nor were they under any duty to specifically observe 
the condition of the road, or other vehicles thereon and 
to be prepared to warn the driver when there was no 
prior knowledge of any danger. Yet the court in effect 
so instructed the jury. The parties admitted that they 
did not see or obserye the danger and did not have 
an opportunity to warn the driver. The court in sub-
stance instructed the jury that if they did not see and 
observe the danger and warn the driver they were con-
tributorily negligent. Such an instruction peremptorily 
informed the jury that they must find a verdict against 
the plantiffs. 
The pleadings and theevidence did not support an 
instruction on contributory negligence of the two pas-
sengers. The instructions as given were prejudicially 
erroneous. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS RE'GARDING CONTRIB-
UTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJU-
DICIAL. 
Instruction No. 4 provided in part as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Dr. James S. 
Devine was guilty of contributory negligency 
which in any degree contribute1d t'o the happenmg 
of this accident, he cannot recover even though 
you find that one or both of said defendants. were 
negligent in the happening of this collision. * * * 
In this connection you are further instructed that 
if you find either one of the woman plaintiffs 
were guilty of contributory negligence which itn 
OIYII!J degree promixately contributed to the hap-
P'ening of the collision, then and in that even 
·such plaintiff so guilty cannot recover." (Empha-
sis added) 
Instruction No. 6, in part, provided as follows: 
"* * * and if they failed to use such reason-
able care, they are negligent, (JJY/)d if such negli-
gence proximately contributes to a;ny extent, how-
ever slight, to produce their injury, they cantnot 
recover." (Emphasis added) 
The words "to any extent, however slight" or "in 
any degree" as used in the instructions, have been con-
sidered by many courts including the Utah S-upreme 
Court. A basic distinction should be made in consider-
ing the above mentioned instructions. The words "how-
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ever slight" or "to any extent" or "in any degree" 
may qualify negligence but not proximate cause. 
Slight negligence which is a proximate cause may 
be a defense, but negligence which is a slight cause is 
not a defense. The vital distinction between thes two 
rules is set f.orth in ·a comment note a.t 114 A.L.R. 830, 
the title of which is "The doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence and its relation to the doctrine of contributory 
negligence," wherein it is stated as follows: 
"While the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff, however slight, will defeat his right to 
recover, if it was the proximate or the concur-
rent cause of his injury, it will not defeat that 
recovery if it merely remotely caused or con-
tributed to the injury." 
The law is clear that contributory negligence of 
plaintiff, however slight, will defeat recovery; and also 
that negligence must be a proximate and not a remote 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries to defeat recovery. T·o 
say that this causal relation n1ay be sufficient, however 
slight, or which contributes in any extent or in any 
degree, is to permit negligence remotely causing or 
slightly affecting injury to defeat recovery. The in-
struction requested by the defendants and given by the 
court in this case sets forth this latter rule and, hence, 
the instruction was prejudicially erroneous. 
Where plaintiff's contributory negligence is a re-
rnote cause, it does not preclude recovery. See Am. 
Jnr. 896, Negligence, Section 212. In 65 C.J.S. 742, 
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Section 129, the necessity of the existence of proximate 
cause is thus stated. 
"It is not sufficient that the negligence for 
which plaintiff is responsible contributed to cause 
the injury complained of. In order to be con-
tributory negligence, such negligence must be a 
proximate cause of the injury. It must be prox-
imate to the injury in the same sense in which 
defendant's negligent act or omission must have 
been proximate to the injury in order to give a 
right of action. 
"The necessity of proximate causation be-
tween the negligence for which plaintiff is respon-
sible and the injury of which he complains has 
been expressed in various ways. Thus, it has 
been said that no negligence is contributory un-
.less it contributes 'substantially,' or 'essentially,' 
or 'materially,' or 'directly,' or 'materially and 
essentially,' as well as 'directly,' to the injury; 
and it must be one of the 'direct,' 'pToducing' or 
'efficient' causes of the injury, 'part of the effi-
cient cause,' or a cause 'without which the injury 
would not have occurred.' The use of these and 
similar expTessions to distinguish the proximate 
from the remote cause of the injury have been 
held to be neither erroneous or misleading, but 
at least one court has taken the contrary view 
with resp·ect to the terms 'material' and 'effi-
cient.' " 
The modern tendency is not to use the words direct, 
material, or efficient in defining proximate cause, but 
rather as is stated in the Restatement of the Law of 
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Torts, S.ection 431, the contributing circumstance must 
he a substantial factor in the chain of causation. The 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Coray v. Southern 
Pacific Company, 112 Utah 166, 185 P. 2d. 935, discus-
sing the question of proximate cause quoted from the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 431, com-
ment (a) as follows: 
"The negligence must also he a substantial 
factor as well as an actual factor in bringing 
about the plaintiff's harm. The word 'substan-
tial' is used to denote the fact that the defend-
ant's conduct has such an effect in producing the 
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as 
a cause, using that word in the proper sense in 
which there always lurks the idea of responsi-
bility, rather than in the so-calld 'philosophic 
sense,' which includes every one of the great 
number of events without wh~ch any happening 
would have occurred. Each of these events is a 
cause in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' yet 
the effect of many of them is so insignificant that 
no ordinary n1ind would think of them as causes." 
Also, see Cox v. Tho1npson 254 P. 2d. 1947, 1051, which 
applies the substantial factor test. 
The substantial factor test in determining proximate 
cause is applied the same whether determining negli-
gence or contributory negligence. Section 465, Restate-
rnent of Torts, states as follows: 
"The plaintiff's negligent exposure of him-
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self to danger or his failure to exercise reason-
able care for his own protection is a legally 
contributing cause of his harm if, but only if, 
it is a substantial factor in bringing about his 
harm and there is no rule restricting his respon-
sibility because of the manner in which his con-
duct contributed to his arm." (Emphasis added) 
There is a considerable difference between a defini-
tion which states that it must be a substantial factor as 
contrasted with the instructions given in this case where 
it is stated that any act on the part of the plaintiffs 
"which in any degree contributed to the happening of 
his accident" or "which in any degree proximately con-
tributed to the happening of the collision" or "such 
negligence proximately contributes to any extent, how-
ever slight, to produce their injury." 
In Rush v. Lagomarsino, 237 P. 1067, 196 Cal. 308, 
the court discussed instruction of a similar nature and 
stated as follows : 
" ( 3) The trial court further erred in the 
same instruction when it charged the jury that 
any fault or negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff, 'which may in OJYI1J wise have contributed to 
the accident,' would preclude a recovery by the 
plaintiff. The vice of this instruction is that it 
ignores the important qualification that, in order 
to defeat a recovery, the negligence of the plain-
tiff must have contributed proximately to the 
injury. F'ernandes v. Sacramento Ciy Ry. Co., 
52 Cal. 45. The error of this instruction was 
accentuated by the further charge of the trial 
court that: 
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'When the negligence of the injured party 
contributed to the injury complained of the 
law will afford no redress, and if, therefore, 
you find in this case that plaintiff was negli-
gent and such negligence contributed to the 
injury complained of, I instruct you that 
the plaintiff cannot recover against the 
defendant.' 
"The negligent act or omission of a plaintiff 
which vvill exculpate a defendant frorr1 responding 
to the plaintiff in damages resulting from the 
plaintiff's negligent act or omission must be a 
contributing, proximate cause of the damages.*** 
"While it is true that the trial court, prior 
to the giving of the instructions immediately 
under consideration, gave a definition of con-
tributory negligence which included the element 
of proximate cause, neverthless, the instructions 
complained of "\Vere so specifically and emphatic-
ally at variance with the requirements of the rule 
relating to contributory negligence that there is, 
we think, no escape from the conclusion that they 
must have confused and 1nisled the jury to the 
prejudice of the plaintiff." (Emphasis added) 
In Rainer Heat & Power Compa;n;y v. City of Seattle, 
193 P. 233, 236, 113 Wash. 95, the court stated as follows: 
"It is contended in behalf of the appellant 
that the trial court erred in its instruction to 
jury as follows: 
'If the plaintiff was guilty of any act of 
negligence alleged against it in the answer 
of the defendant city, which contributed iln 
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any m~er to the d·amages to said heating 
plant for which plaintiff sues, it is your duty 
to deny the plaintiff the right to recover 
any ·damages to said heating plant.' 
"We have italicized the words to be partic-
ularly noticed~ The instruction, we think is er-
roneous under the decisions of this court in 
Spurrier v. Front Street Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 
659, 29 Pac. 346, Cowie v. S·eattle, 22 Wash. 659, 
62 Pac. 121, and Atherton v. Tacoma Ry. & Power 
Co., 30 Wash. 395, 71 Pac. 39; the instruction 
p,utting upon the appellant a higher degree of 
care than the law burdens it with. Appellant's 
contributory negligence may not have been the 
proximate cause of the damage, and still it might 
have been a slight condition contributing to the 
damage in some manner. If its negligence con-
tributed only in such small degree, such negli-
gence would not prevent recovery." 
In Di Nucci v. Hager, 184 ·Or. 555, 200 P. 2d 380, a 
verdict was rendered in favor of defendant and there-
after the trial court granted a motion for new trial. 
On app·eal this )~tter order was affirmed. The court had 
given an instruction similar to the one set forth in this 
point and held that the giving thereof was error and 
stated: 
"In instructing the jury, however, that if 
they found that plaintiff was proceeding at a 
speed which was greater than that provided for 
by the basic rule, and if such negligence was the 
cause of, or contributed in the slightest degree to 
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the proximate cause of the accident, then their 
verdict must be for the defendant, we think error 
was committed that necessitated setting aside the 
verdict rendered by the jury in favor of the 
defendant." (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court recently had occasion to 
consider a similar instruction in the case of Johnson v. 
Lewis et al, 240 P. 2d. 498. However, in that case the 
words "which in any manner, however slight," modified 
the conduct of the party rather than proximate cause. 
The instruction specifically stated in part as follows: 
"Contributory negligence is an act or omis-
sion of the plaintiff which in any manner, how-
ever slight, proximately contributed to cause the 
injury or damage of which he complains." 
The court properly construed the instruction to the 
effect that the word "which in any manner, however 
slight," modified the preceding words "act" or "omis-
sion" and held, according to the distinction heretofore 
discussed, that slight negligence may be sufficient as 
a defense while slight causation would not be sufficient. 
The court in discussing the above mentioned instruction 
stated as follows: 
"The jury was told that contributory negli-
gence is 'any act or omission of the plaintiff 
which in any manner, however slight, proximately 
contributed to cause the injury.' The phrase 
''vhich in any manner, however slight,' is probably 
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technically correct and would do no harm if the 
jury, in spite of it, kept in mind that there must 
be a ngeligent act, that is, an act which lacks 
ordinary care; and that such act must proxi-
mately contribute to cause the injury, that is, 
it must, as a natural and continual sequence 
unbroken by any new or intervening cause pro-
duce the injury complained of. But it seems hard 
to reconcile an act which has those causal quali-
ties as being one which 'in any manner, however 
slight,' causes or even proximately contributes to 
cause the injury. In other words, it seems in 
order for an act to constitute negligence and 
proximately contribute to the causing of an in-
jury it would have to be an effective cause thereof 
and not merely a slight cause of such injury. 
This phrase is calculated to belittle the causal 
relationship necessary between the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff and the accident and 
tends to induce the jury to forget that such con-
tributory negligence must be the result of a 
negligent act, and ·a contrbuting proximate cause 
of the injury and therefore tends to confuse 
rather than enlighten the jury on that problem. 
"This tendency would not be so objectionable 
if ·the sa1ne type of phrase were used in describ-
ing the causal relationship required between the 
defendant's negligence and the accident or injury. 
But no such phrase was used in instructing on 
defendant's negligence." 
· In this case as in the Johnson case no such ins true-
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tion was given 1n defining negligence and proximate 
cause as to the defendants. 
Instructions No. 4 and 6 in the present case clearly 
used the phrase under discussion to modify proximate 
cause rather than negligent conduct. In Instruction No. 
4 it was stated "contributory negligence which in any 
degree contributed to the happening of this accident." 
In Instruction No. 6 it was stated "contributory negli-
gence which in any degree proximately contributed to 
the happening of the collision" **** "and if such negli-
gence proximately contributes to any, extent, however 
slight, to produce their injury, they cannot recover." 
It cannot therefore be argued in this case that the in-
struction is even technically correct and in view of the 
other instructions concerning contributory negligence, 
as herein discussed, the giving of such instructions could 
only constitute prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
The instructions as a whole accentuated, emphasized 
and magnified the issue of contributory neglegence. Af-
ter generally mentioning the issue in the first three in-
structions the court, giving instructions requested by 
the defendants, repetitiously returned to the issue 
almost as if it wrus a chorus to be sung after each other 
instruction. Instructions No. 4, 6 and 8 in detail, gen-
erally and specifically, analyze, dissect and discuss con-
tributory negligence. Instruction No. 5 applied equally 
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to all parties. Instructions No. 7 and 9 minimized, de-
preciated and belittled the duty of defendants. Instruc-
tion No. 10, as an anchor man, discussed unavoidable 
accident. Without more the layman jury must have felt 
compelled to return verdicts of no cause of action. 
F·actually, and based upon the pleadings, there was 
no justification to instruct the jury on an issue of con-
tributory negligence of the p~laintiffs, Miss Gusinda and 
Mrs. Devine. Not only were instructions requested and 
given on this issue, but the instructions themselves placed 
upon these plaintiffs a duty to see and to warn. Since 
these plaintiffs testified that they had not seen and did 
not have the opportunity to warn the driver, the instruc-
tions peremptorily directed the jury against these plain-
tiffs. 
Even assuming the instructions were warranted on 
the issue of contributory negligence, the instructions as 
given were erroneous. Conduct that only contributes "to 
any degree" or "to any extent, however slight," to pro-
duce the injury does not satisfy the requirement of prox-
imate cause which normally demands that chargeable 
conduct be ·a substantial factor in the limitless chain 
of causation. 
In giving instructions requested by the defendants, 
the court committed prejudicial error. An error, though 
conscientiously made cannot be believed sincerely enough 
to make it any less an error. The plaintiffs suffered 
serious injuries as a result of a collision caused by the 
defendants. They should not be required to ·now suffer 
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serious injustice as a result of erroneous instructions 
requested by the defendants. 
R~espectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
and DAN S. BUS.HNELL 
A copy of the foregoing Brief was mailed to Stew-
art, Cannon & Hanson and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 
attorneys for defendants, this 30th day of June, 1954. 
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